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Some Animals Are More Equal than Others:
The Rehnquist Court and "Majority Religion"
Garrett Epps *

I. INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970s, a radical theater company in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, created a play called "How to Make a Woman"
dramatizing the difficulties women face in a patriarchal culture. After
each performance, members of the audience would remain for a
consciousness-raising session with the cast. At one of those
sessions, as I recall, a plainly flustered male audience member asked,
"Do women really want total equality with men?" A female voice
from the audience responded, "Hell, no! We'd be stupid to settle for a
crummy deal1ike that!"
One commentator has famously called equality an "empty idea," 1
but, as a concept, equality is in fact not empty at all, but instead
dangerously overfull. To those who believe they are looking upward
on the ladder of hierarchy, equality seems a golden vision, like
Jacob's angels ascending to heaven; but when those same people look
back down at those below them, the ladder takes on a threatening,
hellish cast. As the old saying goes: "Everyone wants to go to
Heaven, but nobody wants to die." Similarly, everyone wants to rise
to equality, but no one wants to descend to it, even in small things.
The exchange also illustrates that every insurgent movement finds
itself tom between two demands. On the one hand, it may request
* Orlando John and Marian H. Hollis Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. I
would like to thank Professor Neil Richards and the editors of the Washington University
Journal of Law & Policy for their invitation to participate in their symposium. Other members
of the Washington University faculty were also helpful and inspiring. Thanks also to Professors
William Van Alstyne, Ann Hubbard and Robert Tsai, who reviewed a draft. Jessica Freeman
provided research assistance.
I. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
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equality for its members-the simple opportunity to fit into the
existing order of society. On the other hand, it may ask for
transformation-social change so pervasive that the very question of
equality will cease to be meaningful. Thus, the Civil Rights
Movement at its height did not simply demand an end to
discrimination in employment, housing, education and other existing
areas; "it also envisioned a 'beloved community,,,2 defined as a
'social order defined by justice infused by love.',,3 In this new world,
the divisions between the haves and the have-nots would be
reconciled by an overarching vision of justice and brotherhood. So,
too, the feminist movement of the 1960s and 70s imagined a world in
which existing gender categories would disappear, and women would
not seek equality with men because the idea of a male norm would
become meaningless.
These reflections are sparked by the remarkable change that the
Rehnquist Court has made in the law of religious freedom in the
United States. Even for a Court that moved the Constitution radically
towards the right over the last two decades, the degree and direction
of the shift in the law of church and state is not just striking, but
almost vertiginous. The Court narrowed the Free Exercise Clause;4
changed the test for Establishment Clause violations;5 and permitted,
for the first time in modem memory, the expenditure of tax funds for
individual tuition at religious schools. 6 Many who have surveyed the
final term of the Court have noted that the doctrinal result is unstable,
and portends a revolution that not only has not yet ended, but may not
yet even have truly begun. My purpose here is to show the scope of
the change the Court has wrought in the discourse of religion and the

2. The "beloved community" is identified with the social thought of Martin Luther King
Jr.. King once wrote "[o]ur ultimate goal is integration which is genuine intergroup and
interpersonal living. Only through nonviolence can this goal be attained, for the aftermath of
nonviolence is reconcialiation and the creation of the beloved community." MARTIN LUTHER
KING, STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM (1958), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 417, 487 (1988).
3. This definition is of the "redemptive community." Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, http://www.stanford.edu!group/King/about_king/encyclopedia/enc_SNCC.htm
(Oct. 25, 2006).
4. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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Constitution. Warren- and Burger-era concepts such as "neutrality,"
"substantial burden," or "accommodation" no longer address the
schema the Court has created for regulating religion's public role.
Instead, the Court has used the ambiguous idea of equality to create a
remarkable shift-one that is not even remotely tied to the text or
history of the Religion Clauses. Though the shift relies on dribs and
drabs of judicial rhetoric in earlier cases, it is resolutely scornful of
precedent. It is not an evolution, or a refinement, or a correction. It is,
or aspires to be, transformative: it is something brand new.
Early in the Rehnquist years, Justices favoring greater
involvement of state and religion proclaimed the necessity of ending
the oppression of religion. This oppression was of a particular kindnot oppression of religious minorities (which the Court indulgently
suggested is to be expected), but oppression of the religious majority
by the minority forces of secularism. At the Court's mid-point, a
majority of Justices proclaimed that the year of Jubilee had come, and
that religion would henceforth be treated equally, even when equal
treatment seemed to entail violating core values of the Religion
Clauses. 7 In the Court's final term, the same prophetic voice that first
demanded freedom from oppression now announced that, properly
understood, the Constitution does not require equality at all, but a
favored place, at the right hand of Caesar, for certain "traditional"
American faiths, even if the result is state oppression, or at least
conscious disregard, of religious minorities. 8 The result promises to
favor any religious group numerous and powerful enough to make
itself heard at the polls, and in essence relegates "discrete and
insular" religious minorities to the kindly care, or neglect, of the
majority. When majority religions have the opportunity to obtain
government subsidy in particular, they may not be denied it on the
plea that the Establishment Clause forbids this-for that would not be
treating them equally. The argument that religion is special cannot
operate to restrict the speech or practice of a majority. But when
religious minorities find themselves excluded from the famously
disputed public square, that exclusion may be permissible because
religion, or at least some religion, is, after all, special. Not special in
7. Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors, 515 u.s. 819 (1995).
8. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the traditional understanding of enduring special restraints in
exchange for robust constitutional protection, but rather special in the
sense that American history and tradition require that government
and the courts favor a particular religious tradition or traditions. That
tradition or those traditions are never to be treated as less than equal;
but they may, and should, be treated as more than equal. To
paraphrase George Orwell, the new doctrine is pregnant with the idea
that in the noisy, colorful Noah's Ark of American religious tradition,
"[ a]ll animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than
others.,,9
This Article explores the evolution of this remarkable new view of
religion and the Constitution during the Rehnquist Court era. Part II
analyzes Justice Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman,10 which set out
the agenda for the religious caucus of the Court in the early years.
Part III shows how the rhetoric of equality and historical grievance
has been used to dismantle the boundary-for old time's sake, let us
call it a "wall of separation"-that separated religious institutions
from the public fisc. Part IV analyzes Justice Scalia's dissent in
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union. I 1 In that
dissent, as he did in Lee v. Weisman, 12 Justice Scalia seemed to draw
a battle map of how his troops would storm the next walled city of
separation. The Conclusion suggests what the territory may look like
if the pro-"traditional religion" forces achieve all their objectives. It
is, I argue, not a pretty prospect, and it is pregnant with precisely the
malign possibilities that led the Framers to include the oracular but
powerful Religion Clauses in the Bill of Rights. \3
II. RELIGION AS PORNOGRAPHY

The First Amendment contains no overarching language
enunciating a goal of "religious freedom" or "separation of church
and state." Instead, it protects religious freedom through two clauses,

9. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 92 (Centennial ed. 2003).
10. 505 U.S. 577, 631 (I 992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
II. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. See supra note 10.
13. U.S. CaNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ").
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the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 14 Neither
clause is perspicuous in meaning, and together they form a net of
ambiguity-what to one observer may seem like a protection for "the
free exercise of religion" may seem to another like a "special
privilege" granted to religion, and thus an "establishment of religion"
by law. Scholars and judges have struggled, and uniformly failed, to
bring the two clauses into stable harmonic alignment. 15 Until
recently, perhaps the only thing that could be said with some
confidence was that both clauses implied some restraint on majority
rule in matters of religion and the state. The majority could not by
vote strip religious minorities of their free exercise rights; nor could it
use its numerical predominance to proclaim itself the official religion
of the United States or, under the Fourteenth Amendment, of any
particular state.
This anti-majoritariancharacter is now in question for both
clauses. The Rehnquist Court's first major foray into the area of
religion and the Constitution was its unsettling and radical decision in
Employment Division v. Smith,16 in which a majority held that states
could burden, or even outlaw entirely, the free exercise of minority
faiths so long as the legal burden on that free exercise arose from a
neutral, generally applicable law and not from active conscious
hostility. I? If that meant that minority religions could be burdened or
even banned, that was just too bad for them. As Justice Scalia
explained:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the

political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 18

14. ld.
IS. See Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ.
ST. LJ. 563 (1998) (discussing scholars' confusions among the two clauses).
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17. ld. at 878-82.
18. ld. at 890.
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Arguably, Smith represents the flood tide of Justice Scalia's
influence over the other Justices. The record in Smith shows clearly
that Justice Scalia was the Court-maker in the long history of the
case,19 and that he led the majority down a path that he designed.
That path has been sharply criticized by scholarly commentators for
its wholesale revision of precedent and dismissive attitude toward
minority rights. 20 The shocking opinion in Smith got the Court in
trouble both with Congress and with organized religion, and has led
to an elaborate process of attempted legislative overruling and
judicial narrowing in an evident attempt to draw the sting of the
opinion's full-throated majoritarianism. 21
In the Establishment Clause context, Smith suggested that a
majority of the Court might be disposed to ease the burden on a local
religious majority that wanted to include lightly concealed prayers of
its faith in official governmental exercises. During the waning years
of the Burger Court, members of the Court had begun to express
discomfort with the three-part test for Establishment Clause
violations established in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 22 Under the Lemon test,
government action required both a secular purpose and a primary
effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion to be valid. 23 It was
difficult, though not impossible, to argue that officially led or
sanctioned public prayer had either. So, two new tests were offered in
Lemon's place-Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test and Justice
Kennedy's "coercion" test. 24 Under the former, a government action

19. See GARRETI Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL (1st ed.
2001) (documenting Justice Scalia's memoranda shaping the question presented in the final
Smith opinion).
20. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division
v. Smith, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 953,956 n.11 (1998) (collecting hostile scholarly commentary). On
Justice Scalia's use of precedent in Smith, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1120 (1990) (calling use of
precedent "shocking"); see also EpPS, supra note 19, at 217 (opining that a first-year law student
who interpreted cases as Justice Scalia did in the Smith opinion would receive a failing grade);
Garrett Epps, "You Have Been in Afghanistan ": A Discourse on the Van Alstyne Method, 54
DUKE L.J. 1555 (2005) (calling Justice Scalia's published strictures against judges who
manipulate precedent a "cry for help--Stop me before I distinguish more ").
21. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, The Wrong Vampire, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 455 (1999)
(documenting Congressional attempts at overriding Smith).
22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
23. Id. at 612.
24. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, 1.,
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was invalid if, by endorsing religion in general or a particular
religion, it sent "a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.,,25 Under the latter, a government action, even
one endorsing religion, was valid so long as non-believers were not
"coerced" to engage in religious speech or behavior contrary to their
consciences. 26 Justice Kennedy proposed this standard in dissent in
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, a crechedisplay case,27 and it was endorsed by an influential commentator,
Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell. 28
The coercion test in particular seemed to offer a wide field for
government acknowledgement of the majority faith or faiths of a
locality and for public prayer invoking majority religious language so
long as no one was "coerced" to take part, whatever that might mean.
This prospect became clear when the Court considered one of its first
major Establishment Clause cases, Lee v. Weisman. 29 The case was a
challenge by a dissenting student and her parents to the practice of a
Providence, Rhode Island, public school of inviting local clergy
members to deliver religious, but "non-sectarian," invocations and
benedictions at middle- and high-school graduation ceremonies. 30
Under a traditional endorsement test, the practice of having an
officially designated prayer would seem to be, at the very least,
constitutionally shaky. But if coercion became the test, it could be
argued that the official prayers were not even close to the
Establishment Clause line. This was made clear by an exchange
during oral argument in the case. 3l Former assistant Attorney General
Charles W. Cooper, Jr., representing the Providence school district,

concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688. For a good discussion of this test, see Jesse H. Choper, The
Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL'y 499 (2002).
26. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-63.
27. 492 U.S. 573.
28. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 933 (1986).
29. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
30. Id. at 580-81.
31. Transcript of Oral Argument, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014).
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first stated that the Clause did not forbid the "non-sectarian" prayer at
issue in the case, and suggested that it would not even bar a sectarian
prayer containing references to specific deities. 32 Justice O'Connor
then asked whether the Clause would be violated if "a State
legislature were to adopt a particular religion as the State religion,
just like they might pass a resolution saying the bolo tie is the State
necktie[,]" so long as the legislature added "[w]e're not going to
enforce it.,,33 Cooper replied that it would be permissible "if it is
purely noncoercive.,,34
Cooper's answer produced a visible reaction from a number of the
Justices, and may well have been the turning point in the case. 35
Regardless, the result in Lee was a major disappointment to religious
conservative groups who had hoped that the Court would adopt a
lenient "coercion" test for government speech acknowledging or
endorsing religion. In a five-to-four decision, the Court struck down
the practice as coercive because high-school students, even though
formally allowed to receive their diplomas without attending the
ceremony, were subject to peer pressure and other coercive forces
sufficient to make them feel obligated to attend, stand, and bow their
heads for the prayer, thereby suggesting assent. 36 The opinion was
written by Justice Kennedy, who had earlier been the apostle of the
coercion test,37 and seemed to mark the end of that proposed test as a
means of substantially altering the law of the Establishment Clause as
it relates to public prayer in schools and elsewhere. A sophisticated,
psychological view of coercion would limit many majority practices
that might be permitted under a formalistic test that required legal
penalty before a government practice crossed the Establishment
Clause line.

32. Id. at 7-8. Cooper was later asked whether the United States could print "In Jesus
Christ We Trust" on its coins, to which he replied: "I don't think we would put that on the
coins, but I think that is because, at this stage, that would not be politically possible .... " Id. at
10.
33. !d. at 10-11; see also Linda Greenhouse, Court Appears Skeptical of Argument for
Prayer, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 7,1991, at A22.
34. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 31, at II.
35. Greenhouse, supra note 33.
36. Lee, 505 U.S. at 597-99.
37. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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The decision in Lee would repay much more detailed study,
particularly given the importance of Justice Kennedy in the evolution
of the Court's cases regarding the Religion Clauses. What is most
important for purposes of this essay is the remarkable dissent by
Justice Scalia, who argued passionately that the prohibition of the
graduation prayers was not simply wrong, but actively oppressive to
certain religious believers. He noted:
The reader has been told much in this case about the personal
interest of Mr. Weisman and his daughter [the plaintiffs], and
very little about the personal interests on the other side. They
are not inconsequential. Church and state would not be such a
difficult subject if religion were, as the Court apparently thinks
it to be, some purely personal avocation that can be indulged
entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one's
room. For most believers it is not that, and has never been.
Religious men and women of almost all denominations have
felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of
God as a people, and not just as individuals, because they
believe in the "protection of divine Providence," as the
Declaration of Independence put it, not just for individuals but
for societies; because they believe God to be, as Washington's
first Thanksgiving Proclamation put it, the "Great Lord and
Ruler of Nations."
The narrow context of the present case involves a community's
celebration of one of the milestones in its young citizens' lives,
and it is a bold step for this Court to seek to banish from that
occasion, and from thousands of similar celebrations
throughout this land, the expression of gratitude to God that a
majority of the community wishes to make. The issue before
us today is not the abstract philosophical question whether the
alternative of frustrating this desire of a religious majority is to
be preferred over the alternative of imposing "psychological
coercion," or a feeling of exclusion, upon nonbelievers. Rather,
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the question is whether a mandatory choice in favor of the
former has been imposed by the United States Constitution. 38
This was an important claim, one that would echo throughout the
upcoming caselaw. It asserted that the religious rights guaranteed
under the Constitution are not solely, or even primarily, individual
rights, designed to protect the conscience against state imposition, but
rather group rights that inhere specially in the majority of the
members of a community who wish to order their public ceremonial
life in a way that seems religiously appropriate to them. Under Justice
Scalia's analysis, the decision in Lee actively oppressed the
(presumable) majority of high-school graduates and their families by
denying them a central practice of their religion. 39 Justice Scalia
appeared to be implying that the decision denied religious believers,
even though they were apparently the majority, their humanity and
further stigmatized them. The refusal to allow them to use
government occasions for prayer sends a message that their beliefs
are shameful, like sexually explicit films.
Such oppression, exclusion, and stigmatization are intolerable for
any group, and even less tolerable when imposed, as Justice Scalia's
opinion suggests, on a majority by a tiny, elite minority. If that is so,
then of course the next question to be faced by the oppressed majority
is which alternative they would seek as remedy for their oppression:
equality or transformation.

III. THE WOODEN HORSE
The first answer to this question was provided by Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette. 4o For the time being, the key
demand was to be equality. Pinette concerned the request of a local
Ku Klux Klan chapter to be allowed to place a large Latin cross
honoring the Christmas season on the lawn of the Ohio State Capitol
in Columbus. 41 The lawn was the site of a few displays, including a
state Christmas tree, a privately sponsored menorah, and the United

38. Lee, 505 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. ld.
40. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
41. !d. at 757-58.
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Way "thermometer.,,42 The state turned down the Klan's request,
however, on the stated ground that allowing its cross to appear
temporarily on the lawn would create the impression that the state
endorsed this sectarian religious symbol. 43
There was no disagreement that the lawn was a public forum, nor
that the refusal to allow the cross constituted content-based
discrimination. However, the state argued that the Establishment
Clause gave it a compelling state interest in maintaining the
discrimination. 44 It placed particular emphasis on the fact that the
property at issue controlled the entrance to the very headquarters of
state government, thus making any mistaken attribution of state
endorsement of the cross particularly troublesome for misled
citizens. 45 The Court gave short shrift to this interest; in essence, the
opinion by Justice Scalia suggested that the Establishment Clause
could never provide a reason to discriminate against religious speech,
even when misperception of government endorsement was likely.46
In addition, Justice Scalia made clear that equality between
religious and non-religious expression always trumped Establishment
concerns, forming a floor of protection below which religious
expression could never fall. He noted that religion is truly special
under the First Amendment-not subject to special restraints, but in
every case a special favorite of the laws. 47 The desire to protect
against public misperception of government endorsement of private
religious speech
exiles private religious speech to a realm of less-protected
expression heretofore inhabited only by sexually explicit
displays and commercial speech. It will be a sad day when this
Court casts piety in with pornography, and finds the First
Amendment more hospitable to private expletives than to
private prayers. This would be merely bizarre were religious

42. Id.
Jd. at 758-59.
Id. at 761-62.
45. Id. at 763.
46. Id. at 769 ("[T]he State may not, on the claim of misperception of official
endorsement, ban all private religious speech from the public square, or discriminate against it
by requiring religious speech alone to disclaim public sponsorship.").
47. Id. at 767.
43.
44.
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speech simply as protected by the Constitution as other forms
of private speech; but it is outright perverse when one
considers that private religious expression receives preferential
treatment under the Free Exercise Clause. 48
Once again, the Court's refusal to give special concern to religious
speech would stigmatize it, and transform it into lesser-value speech,
such as adult films. Equality would not be enough; religious speech
was to be elevated to a realm that might be called "more than
equality."
The consequences of preferential treatment became more clear a
short while later in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,49 a case
that used equality concepts to make a portentous change in the
doctrine of the Establishment Clause. At issue in Rosenberger was
whether the University of Virginia could maintain a rule denying
student activity funds to publications that "primarily promote [d] or
manifest[ed] a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality.,,5o The publication at issue, Wide Awake, had as its mission
"to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the
faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a
personal relationship with Jesus Christ means.,,51 At the outset, it is
important to characterize the University's claim, which was that the
desire not to violate the Establishment Clause constituted a
"compelling interest" that allowed its admittedly content-based
distinction between Wide Awake and The Daily Cavalier (a secular
newspaper) in their eligibility for activity funds. 52 In his dissent,
Justice Souter characterized the issue as whether the Establishment
Clause allowed "direct funding of core religious activities by an arm
of the State.,,53 That practice, Souter noted, had been regarded as
impermissible throughout the evolution of the Court's Establishment

48. ld. at 767-77 (citations omitted).
49. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
50. Id. at 822-23.
51. ld. at 826.
52. ld. at 837-38. The University backed away from this position when the case reached
the Supreme Court, but because the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals based its decision on the
point, the Court proceeded to address the issue. Id.
53. ld. at 863 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Clause jurisprudence. 54 Indeed, Souter noted that it had been
condemned by Madison himself in his Memorial and Remonstrance,
which objected to Virginia's proposed Clergy Assessment on a
number of grounds, including that "the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of anyone establishment, may force him to conform to any
other establishment in all cases whatsoever[.],,55
Justice Souter's point seems both clear and historically irrefutable.
It does not, however, mean that the issue raised by Rosenberger was
not a difficult one. Wide Awake and its Christian student editors were
undoubtedly excluded from a fee program that allowed student
groups not devoted to prose1ytization to participate. The University's
rule also required it to scrutinize the applications of all potential fee
recipients, a practice that could give rise to both the potential for
prior restraint on speech and the danger of entanglement of the
University with religious organizations. 56
But what is striking about the majority opinion in Rosenberger is
not that it held in favor of Wide Awake, but that in doing so it
pronounced that the issue raised by Justice Souter was really not very
important. There was no question, either between the majority and
the dissenters or between the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit
panel that had upheld the University rule,57 that the distinction was
content-based (though one might differ whether the basis was, as the
majority insisted, Wide Awake's viewpoint or its subject matter). 58
The sole question involved the weight to be given to the
Establishment Clause and its hitherto perspicuous bar on direct state
financial aid to the propagation of religious faith. The majority found
that the Establishment Clause interest was simply not present in these
cases because the program was "neutral" toward religion, rather than
being "a tax levied for the direct support of a church or group of
54. [d. at 873-76.
55. [d. at 868 (citations omitted).
56. That means "entanglement" under its old meaning of, well, entanglement, see Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985), rather than its newspeak meaning of primary effect, see
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-35 (1997).
57. 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994).
58. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 ("We conclude, nonetheless, that here ... viewpoint
discrimination is the proper way to interpret the University's objections to Wide Awake.").
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churches.,,59 In addition, the Establishment Clause was not violated
because the University funds that flowed to the printer of Wide
Awake did not pass through the editors' hands, but rather came
straight from the University, and because the money came from a
mandatory activity fee paid by each student rather than "a general tax
designed to raise revenue for the University.,,6o For those reasons, the
subsidy program was "a far cry from a general public assessment
designed and effected to provide financial support for a church.,,61
The Establishment Clause thus turned out to be far less serious an
obstacle than the dissent perceived it to be. Implicitly, it formed a bar
only to programs using general taxation to create programs that
benefit either specific religions or all religions, but not non-religious
groups. For this reason, the admitted content discrimination in the fee
program could not be justified, and Wide Awake received its funding.
This was a result grounded in a demand for equality, or, as the
majority phrased it, "neutrality.,,62 But the trans formative demand is
also lurking in this case, couched in Justice Thomas' concurrence. 63
For Justice Thomas, the correct interpretation of the Establishment
Clause would not pose any barrier to the direct award of general tax
funds to a religious organization; indeed, the Virginia Assessment
that outraged Madison would have been fine, Justice Thomas wrote,
if it had only been "a truly neutral program that would benefit
religious adherents as part of a large class of beneficiaries defined
without reference to religion.,,64 Analyzing the sparse legislative
record of the First Amendment, Justice Thomas concluded that
"Madison saw the principle of nonestablishment as barring
governmental preferences for particular religious faiths. ,,65 Justice
Thomas admitted that not every analysis of Madison's thought would

59. Id. at 840.
60. Id. at 840-41.
61. Id. at 841.
62. Id. at 837-46. That the two tenns are not always synonymous any second child can
tell us.
63. Id. at 852 (Thomas, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 853 n.l. Justice Thomas reviewed the historical debates surrounding the
Virginia "Assessment Controversy," and concluded that the bill violated the equality principle
"not because it allowed religious groups to participate in a generally available government
program, but because the bill singled out religious entities for special benefits." Id. at 854--55.
65. Id. at 856.

2006]

Some Animals Are More Equal

337

support this narrow reading; indeed, Madison himself seemed to
contradict it both in the Remonstrance and in his other works. 66 But
what did he know and who really cares what he said?
[E]ven if more extreme notions of the separation of church and
state can be attributed to Madison, many of them clearly stem
from "arguments reflecting the concepts of natural law, natural
rights, and the social contract between government and a civil
society," rather than the principle of nonestablishment in the
Constitution. In any event, the views of one man do not
establish the original understanding of the First Amendment. 67
Rosenberger arguably reached a revolutionary result: when
religion demands equal treatment, the special protections placed
around it in the Constitution itself are to be given relatively little
weight. When a religious activity can be characterized as speech (as
opposed to, say, ingesting peyote), it must be protected exactly as
non-religious speech is, and indeed it is entitled to subsidy if any
non-religious speech receives government funds. This result is key to
the revolution thus far, but the concurrence directs our attention to an
even more radical position. Under the new disposition, James
Madison, author of the Remonstrance and principal sponsor of the
First Amendment, is to be regarded as an extremist.
Mitchell v. Helms 68 advanced the program yet another giant step.
Remember that Rosenberger allowed state money to flow for a
religious publication because (1) it was not tax money, and (2) it was
not paid to the organization and thus could not be diverted from the
intended purpose. 69 Under the new doctrine enunciated by four
Justices in Mitchell, however, equality demands that government aid
in a "neutral program" must flow to religious organizations, even if
funded from general tax revenues 70 and even if the program contains
no safeguards to protect against their direct use by the religious
organization. 71

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 854-58.
Id. at 856 (citation omitted).
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841.
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 816.
71. !d. at 832-35.
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At issue in Mitchell was a federally funded program that loaned
educational materials, such as library books, computers and software,
and audio-visual materials, to qualifying schools, both public and
private. 72 The materials themselves were required to be "secular,
neutral and nonideological.,,73 The Fifth Circuit, though admitting
that cases such as Rosenberger had scrambled the law of aid to
religious organizations, held that provision of these materials to
Catholic schools in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, violated the
Establishment Clause. 74 The Supreme Court reversed this ruling and
reinstated the program. 75 Though the Court could not produce a
majority for any opinion explaining the result, Justice Thomas
authored an opinion for himself and three others. 76 Justice Thomas
found that the aid at issue flowed to religious schools as a result of
"private choices," even though the aid itself went directly from
government to the schools. 77 This meant the program was neutral,
and thus not a violation of the Clause. 78 The distinction between
direct and indirect aid, he wrote, was no longer important. 79 This case
did not concern "direct payments of money," and so it did not cross
the Establishment Clause line. 80
Justice Thomas conceded that the materials might be diverted
from their intended secular use-but so what? There was no longer a
rule against divertible aid; the only rule was that aid must be provided
by neutral criteria. 81 What happens to it after that was simply no
longer an issue. "[A]ny use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be
attributed to the government and is thus not of constitutional
concern," he explained, so long as the content of the aid itself is not
religious and eligibility for such aid IS determined in a

72. Id. at 801-02.
73. Id. at 802 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1) (2000)).
74. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 1998).
75. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836.
76. Id. at 801-36. Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Scalia. Id. at 80 I.
77. Id. at 831 ("Because Chapter 2 aid is provided pursuant to private choices, it is not
problematic that one could fairly describe Chapter 2 as providing 'direct' aid.").
78. Jd. at 829.
79. Id. at 818 ("Whether one chooses to label this program 'direct' or 'indirect' is a rather
arbitrary choice, one that does not further the constitutional analysis. ").
80. Id. at 819-20.
81. Id. at 820.
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constitutionally permissible manner.82 This is true even when the
recipient school is "pervasively sectarian,,,83 meaning, in essence,
that it teaches every subject and conducts every school activity from
a religious point of view. Although the concept of pervasive
sectarianism was used by the Court to strike down an aid program as
recently as 1985,84 Justice Thomas demanded its demise as a
constitutional concept. His demand was based in history and
grounded in the demand for equality. He noted:
[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a
shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow ....
Opposition to aid to "sectarian" schools acquired prominence
in the 1870's with Congress's consideration (and near passage)
of the Blaine Amendment, which would have amended the
Constitution to bar any aid to sectarian institutions.
Consideration of the amendment arose at a time of pervasive
hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general,
and it was an open secret that "sectarian" was code for
"Catholic." Notwithstanding its history, of course, "sectarian"
could, on its face, describe the school of any religious sect, but
the Court eliminated this possibility of confusion when, in
Hunt v. McNair, ... it coined the term "pervasively
sectarian"-a term which, at that time, could be applied almost
exclusively to Catholic parochial schools and which even
today's dissent exemplifies chiefly by reference to such
schools.
In short, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the
exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise
permissible aid programs, and other doctrines of this Court bar
it. This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now. 85
This passage sounded the trumpet in a way that leaders of the
Civil Rights Movement did during the 1960s. Any governmental
distinction with a history of oppressive content is now to be regarded

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 826.
See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29.
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as illegitimate, even if neutrally applicable. It is hard to be
unsympathetic with that demand. It is the kind of contextual
sophistication missing from decisions such as Washington v. Davis 86
and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson. 87 But the historical
sophistication did not mark a permanent change in the discourse of
the conservative majority of the Court. It stands in marked contrast to
the bland unconcern of Chief Justice Rehnquist shortly afterwards in
his opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 88 Zelman finally breached
the Establishment walls that had allegedly been important in
approving the earlier payments of state funds to religious
organizations.
Zelman concerned a voucher program by which general tax funds
were paid directly to religious schools in the form of tuition vouchers
signed over to the schools by parents of children escaping
Cleveland's failing public education system. 89 Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote that there was no Establishment Clause violation
because the vouchers were paid as part of a "neutral" program of
"true private choice.,,9o The fact that ninety-six percent of the
vouchers went to religious schools was hardly worth mentioning;91
context no longer seemed to matter. "The constitutionality of a
neutral educational aid program simply does not tum on whether and
why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are
run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the
aid at a religious school.,,92 After all, many students did not use the
vouchers at all, choosing instead to attend public schools. 93 In
essence, the history of controversy regarding tuition payments to
religious schools was not only irrelevant, but almost nonexistent;
ninety-six percent was close enough for government work.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.
93.

426 U.s. 229 (1976).
488 u.s. 469 (1989).
536 U.s. 639, 643-63 (2002).
Id. at 644-48.
Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 658.
!d.
Id. at 655.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion announced that, with the aid of
neutrality/equality, a key objective had been reached. What would be
the next redoubt, and how would it be stormed?
IV. THE SOUND OF HIS WINGS

Perhaps a portent of the answer can be found in Justice Scalia's
dissent in McCreary County v. ACLU,94 decided at the end of the
Court's last term. In McCreary, a five-justice majority held that two
Kentucky counties violated the Establishment Clause by adorning
their courthouses with large displays of the Ten Commandments
surrounded by other historical documents purporting to demonstrate
that the American legal system flows from Biblical values. 95 Using
the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, the majority held that the display in
context lacked a secular purpose, and thus could not stand. 96
Because the fifth vote in McCreary was Justice O'Connor's, her
retirement may mean that this case will be the last victory for
anything approaching separationism, and that the Roberts Court will
begin from the forward position secured by the Rehnquist Court and
move the church-state line even more radically in the pro-religion
direction. If so, Justice Scalia's ferocious dissent in McCreary may
set forth the new plan of attack. 97 Justice Scalia announced that,
having secured equal access to the public fisc, religious conservatives
should not be satisfied with equality any longer. A proper end of
repression demanded not only preferential treatment for all religious
speech, but also a key governmental role for certain religious beliefs
designated as "traditional" or "majority" beliefs.98 Justice Scalia
suggested that the posting of a Ten Commandments display is
permissible not on a principle of neutrality or even "neutrality-plus"
for religious speech generally, but because the Ten Commandments
are part of the majority religion that the Establishment Clause, in
spite of its seemingly prohibitory language, tacitly establishes. He
noted:

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
Id. at 2732 (affinning the Sixth Circuit's opinion).
Id. at 2732-45.
Id. at 2748--64 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2752-53.
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If religion in the public forum had to be entirely
nondenominational, there could be no religion in the public
forum at all. One cannot say the word "God," or "the
Almighty," one cannot offer public supplication or
thanksgiving, without contradicting the beliefs of people that
there are many gods, or that God or the gods pay no attention
to human affairs. With respect to public acknowledgment of
religious belief, it is entirely clear from our Nation's historical
practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard
of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it
permits the disregard of devout atheists. . . . The three most
popular religions in the United States, Christianity, Judaism,
and Islam-which combined account for 97.7% of all
believers-are monotheistic. All of them, moreover (Islam
included), believe that the Ten Commandments were given by
God to Moses, and are divine prescriptions for a virtuous life.
Publicly honoring the Ten Commandments is thus
indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other
religions is concerned, from publicly honoring God. Both
practices are recognized across such a broad and diverse range
of the population-from Christians to Muslims-that they
cannot be reasonably understood as a government endorsement
of a particular religious viewpoint. 99
This is an extraordinary claim. It suggests that the government
may disregard the religious beliefs of its citizens who do not share the
majority belief system. Note that the permitted disregard extends not
only to exotic polytheists, but also to those who believe in a god who
"pay[s] no attention to human affairs,"lOo in other words, to the
successors of the eighteenth-century Deists who contributed both to
the American Revolution and to the content of the Religion Clauses;
outnumbered in the 2004 census figures, they simply no longer count.
Once the idea of constitutionalized disregard is admitted to the
discourse, a limiting principle seems elusive. The very statistical
source that Justice Scalia relies on also suggests that nearly seventy-

99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 2753.
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seven percent of the U.S. population is Christian. 101 Many historical
revisionists now strongly press the claim that our Constitution and the
nation it defines are in fact specifically Protestant Christian
constructs, owing little or nothing to any other religious faith. 102
What limiting principle would prevent a future Justice Scalia from
finding no Establishment violation in the Beatitudes or in John 3: 16?
As the animal revolution moved into its final phase, the sheep in
Animal Farm were eventually trained to bleat, "Four legs good two
legs better." 103 Can the time be far away when we will hear the claim,
"One God good, three Gods in One better?" And how far will we be
then from the precise kind of establishment that the old extremist,
James Madison, sought to forestall?
In the guise of a proper understanding of the past, Justice Scalia,
the prophet of Lee v. Weisman, now points us toward a somewhat
ominous future.
V. THE RETURN OF THE PAST
"I know, and all the world knows," said William H. Seward in his
prophetic "Irrepressible Conflict" speech, "that revolutions never go
backwards." 104 Certainly, victorious revolutionaries seldom moderate
their demands or their faith in the rightness of their cause. The
Rehnquist Court moved the law of church and state an enormous
distance; with the introduction of Chief Justice Roberts, it is hard to
imagine that the appetite of the religious conservative movement will
be slaked. Justice Scalia has proclaimed the objective of removing
"majority" religion from the strictures of the Establishment Clause.
How might this be done?
101. u.s. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005,
at 55 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract.html.
102. See, e.g., DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND
RELIGION (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution intended political
influence and office to be wielded only by Protestants, excluding not only atheists and Deists,
but also Catholics and "Hebrews"). Barton might be regarded as a crackpot, but he in fact
played a prominent role in the 2004 Bush-Cheney campaign, which paid his way to speak to
Christian groups around the country on the "proper" role of religion under the Constitution.
103. OR WELL, supra note 9, at 93.
104. William Henry Seward, Speech Delivered at Rochester, N.Y.: On The Irrepressible
Conflict (Oct. 25, 1858), available at htpp://www.nyhistory.com/central/conflict.htm.
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One possible route is suggested by a recent article by Professor
Noah Feldman of New York University.l05 How can we solve the
tension between religious conservatives, who seek to enshrine their
religion in law, and secularists, who believe that the kind of
acknowledgement Justice Scalia proclaimed to be legitimate will in
fact exclude and stigmatize those who do not share the official
monotheism? Professor Feldman offers a comprehensive solution:
"Put simply, it is this: offer greater latitude for religious speech and
symbols in public debate, but also impose a stricter ban on state
financing of religious institutions and activities.,,106 Moments of
silence in public schools, public prayer at Friday night football
games, public-school courses in "intelligent design," and privately
funded religious monuments on courthouse greens would be
permitted under the Establishment Clause; the kind of subsidies now
legitimized by Mitchell and Zellman might not.
Obviously, this solution would not satisfy those who believe that
governmental invocation of the Judeo-Christian God excludes and
stigmatizes them. Professor Feldman offers this counsel:
Take the fact that the government treats Christmas as a
national holiday. It would be absurd if Jews or Muslims or
Hindus or Buddhists felt fundamentally excluded from
citizenship by this fact-and I would venture to suggest that
very few do. . . . Some members of religious minorities may
choose to spend December feeling bad that they are not part of
the majority culture-but they would have this same problem
even if Christmas were not a national holiday, since Christmas
would still be all around them. The answer is for them to
strengthen their own identities and be proud of who they are,

lOS. Noah Feldman, A Church-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 10446246. I do not mean to suggest that Professor Feldman is somehow in league with
Justice Scalia, or that his suggestions are part of a Scalian program. There is a difference
between a revolution and a conspiracy. In the former, each victory fuels a new demand, often
unforeseen by anyone involved beforehand. The typical response from the non-revolutionary
side is a kind of temporizing, a disposition to compromise, to give up some ground hitherto
thought sacrosanct in order to defend other territory. Every revolution has its Kerensky, its
Bani-Sadr; and their efforts at compromise are usually not made more effective by the simple
fact that they are sincerely meant.
106. Id.
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not to insist that the majority give up its own celebration to
accommodate them. 107
This "solution" is offered in good faith and with good will. But I
must respectfully suggest that there are several things wrong with it.
First, am I the only one to hear in the admonition to minorities that
they should "strengthen their own identities and be proud of who they
are" an unintentional echo of some famous words from a now
overruled case? In 1896, a majority of the Court responded to another
claim of exclusion and stigmatization by noting:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument
to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it. !Os
Whatever may have been the case in 1896, today we know that
recognizing human inequality under law rarely strengthens those
denoted as less worthy of concern than the majority; instead, the
opposite is more often true. Designating winners and losers in this
way usually whets the appetites of winners for more superiority and
privilege; this is the second flaw in Professor Feldman's proposed
solution. Revolutions do not go backwards. If the "majority" agrees
to such a "compromise," as Feldman proposes, history suggests that
there is little reason to believe that the "compromise" will hold.
I recently completed a lengthy study of the years before and after
the Civil War. 109 One of the most striking events in that period was
the rapid abandonment by the South and its allies of the famous
Compromise of 1850. At a time when "compromising" promised to
win the South what it wanted-a vastly strengthened Fugitive Slave
Law,-its leaders solemnly intoned that the Missouri Compromise

107. Feldman, supra note 105.
108. Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,551 (1896).
109. By "lengthy study," I mean "a long period devoted to study." However, given the
opportunity, I will cite the fruits of that "lengthy study." GARRETT EpPs, DEMOCRACY REBORN:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR
AMERICA (2006).
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line (slavery pennitted to the South and prohibited to the North) was
part of a covenant secured by the region's word of honor. 110 Scarcely
four years later, sensing an opening, the South repudiated the
compromise and demanded "popular sovereignty" in Kansas (well
north of the "compromise" line) so that slave-owners could take their
chattels there and set up a slave system. III It is not unreasonable to
sunnise that the winners in Professor Feldman's "compromise" will
take the real advantage they gain under the Establishment Clause and
use it to bolster their case for subsidy and public acknowledgement.
The third problem with Feldman's solution is the idea that a core
constitutional issue such as the Establishment Clause can be treated
as a bipolar dispute between warring parties to be "settled" by
dividing the First Amendment up like the West Bank of the Jordan.
All of us have a stake in the Constitution, whether we are "values
evangelicals" or "secularists" (to use Professor Feldman's tenns), or
whether we simply do not adhere to either of his two positions. It is
not the job of judges to sit down and dole out the territory. Instead,
constitutional adjudication is (in some admittedly hard-to-define
way) supposed to emanate from the text, history, structure, values
and case law originating in the document itself. Sometimes that means
denying even half a loaf to majorities. 112 Nowhere does that seem
more salient than in the area of the Establishment Clause, which, at
its conception no less than today, emanates precisely from a desire to
limit the extent to which majorities may impose their preferred
religious identities on minorities. As we look back on the religious ill
will generated by the election of 2004, we should surely conclude
that a sea-change in the Establishment Clause and a new
empowennent of the majority bodes ill for the civic peace. The
potential radicalism of the latest prophecy is so sweeping that one is
moved to sympathize with Justice O'Connor, who wrote her
valedictory in McCreary to emphasize her concern over the way
things were moving in the church-state area: "Those who would
renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must therefore
110. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATILE-CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 70-77,

117-18 (1988).
Ill. Jd.atI21-23.
112. See, e.g., W. Va. StateBd. ofEduc. v. Bamette,319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has
served us so weB for one that has served others so poorly?" 113

113. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2746 (2005) (O'Connor, 1., concurring).

